Chat with us, powered by LiveChat Define the PROBLEM (in one or two sentences). In this definition make sure it is clear whose problem it is, and why it is so important that somebody should worry about it. If there are several problems in the case, you must either choose the most important one or define the problem broadly so that the sub-problems are part of it. - Writeden

Requirements: 1- 2 pages, 1000 words

Rules for Written Case Analyses

Each written case analysis may be no longer than 1000 words, plus tables, charts, etc. In other words, the text must be at most 1000 words; you can add tables, pictures and graphs if helpful.

You must format the case analyses in this structure:

1. Define the PROBLEM (in one or two sentences). In this definition make sure it is clear whose problem it is, and why it is so important that somebody should worry about it. If there are several problems in the case, you must either choose the most important one or define the problem broadly so that the sub-problems are part of it. This is the most important part of the analysis, since you must aim at the right target in order to hit it.

2. Define the METHOD. In one or two sentences explain what method you are going to use to solve the problem. A method could be interest arbitrage to pick the best investment, or hedging techniques to find the least-cost hedge, or some other theory or technique. The method is NOT the solution to the case.

3. Do the ANALYSIS. In this section, use most of your 1000 words to solve the problem. This should be reasonably easy, since you have already defined the problem carefully and told me what method you are going to use to solve it.

4. Draw some CONCLUSIONS. This may be a final paragraph in which you emphasize your solution to the problem and why it is best.

This case was written by Professor Nirmalya Kumar and Dr Sheetal Mittal at the Singapore Management University. The case was prepared solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. This case was developed with the support of Retail Centre of Excellence (RCoE). Copyright © 2018, Singapore Management University Version: 2018-06-14 SMU898 AMAZON AND WALMART ON COLLISION IN INDIA (CASE B) Amazon and Walmart both identified the Indian market as the next battleground after the US, with India representing the most attractive e-commerce market globally. In 2017, the e-commerce industry in India reached US$38.5 billion; by 2026 it was estimated to more than quadruple to US$200 billion. While Walmart had entered the country in 2007, it was only around 2013, the same time as Amazon’s entry into the market, when it began to really focus on the online retail industry in the country. What followed was a slew of investments by the two global giants in a bid to outdo each other and establish a firm stronghold in India. By 2018, they overcame the local competition to emerge as the dominant e-commerce players in the market, and each other’s closest rivals. The question going forward was of sustainability. Which of the two would be able to stand the test of time, and emerge as the winner in the subcontinent? E-commerce in IndiaOver the ten years 2007 -2017, internet penetration in the country grew from 4% to 35% (65% in urban areas, and 21% in rural areas), largely on account of rising smart phone penetration and the launch of 4G networks. By 2021, the number of internet users was expected to increase from 481 million to 829 million.1 Online shopping had been on an accelerated upswing since the second half of 2017, with 108 million consumers buying digitally through the year – a year on year (y-o-y) growth of 23% in gross merchandise value (GMV) in 2017, and a projected y-o-y growth of 60% in GMV in 2018.2,3 Online retail penetration was increasing; new online shoppers contributed to more than 65% of the growth in e-commerce sales, and were expected to account for 12% of total retail in 2026 (2% in 2017), with more than 50% of internet users shopping online.4 While electronics and apparel were the largest e-commerce segments, Indian shoppers had taken to online retail across a wide range of categories (refer to Exhibit 1 for the percentages share of online sales across product categories). An Amazon India spokesperson shared, Customers buy everything ranging from diapers to sofas, from LCD TVs and fridges to bulbs, vegetable choppers and shampoos, debunking the myth that consumers only look for high-price-point items.5 This surge in e-retail was attributed to three key factors. The first was improvements in technology For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 2/9 that provided faster internet speeds and higher security when sharing financial details on the internet. The second reason was greater access to the internet through smartphones, even in tier 2 and tier 3 cities. By end 2017, there were 678 million mobile subscribers in urban areas, and 500 million subscribers in rural areas.6 And finally, growth was spurred by practices such as aggressive marketing by the e-commerce players through advertising, offers such as cash back guarantee and cash on delivery option, and services that provided fast delivery, easy access to global brands, and low prices.7 Favourable government policies, such as a thrust towards cashless transactions, high budget allocation to make available high-speed broadband connectivity at low tariffs, and extension of 100% foreign direct investment from only B2B models to include the online retail of goods and services under the marketplace model, also led to a significant influx of investment in the e-commerce industry by both new and existing players.8 The leading e-retailers in the country were Flipkart, followed by Amazon and Snapdeal (refer to Exhibit 2 for market share estimates for 2017). Walmart in India Walmart opened its first store in India in 2009, having entered the market in 2007 through a joint venture with Bharti Enterprises, an Indian business conglomerate. The two partners had planned to open hundreds of retail stores in the country, but could only set up 20 in the main cities across nine states of India before the joint venture was dissolved in 2013 due to allegations of having broken US anti-bribery laws.9 Walmart then set up a wholly owned subsidiary and took full control of its stores. The wholesale stores, named ‘Best Price Modern Wholesale Stores’, were membership based and catered to a B2B market targeting small resellers and mom & pop stores, as well as institutional buyers such as hotels, restaurants and offices. Walmart could not operate its own B2C retail stores in the country due to legal restrictions on overseas investments in multi-brand retail and a requirement to procure at least 30% of its goods from small and midsize Indian producers. In 2015, Walmart India opened its 21st store, and in 2017 its first fulfilment centre in Mumbai with plans to open the second one in 2018. In 2017, the retailer reported total revenues of US$549 million, a 10% y-o-y growth, of which food products contributed 53%. Though the company incurred expenses of US$560 million, and made a loss of US$11.3 million, it continued to narrow down its losses (by 27% in 2017) compared to the previous years.10 Foray into e-commerce As early as 2010, Walmart had set up an e-commerce team to explore a B2B online retail venture in India in line with its global focus on e-retailing. However, the falling out with its Indian partner had let to the project being taken up only later in 2014. In 2016, Walmart identified Flipkart, an Indian online retail company, as its potential e-commerce partner in India. In 2018, after prolonged discussions lasting almost two years, Walmart bought a 77% stake in Flipkart for US$16 billion, the biggest purchase of an e-commerce company globally. The acquisition would For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 3/9 not only enable the retailer to be present in the high growth e-commerce market in India, but also use Flipkart’s expertise to expand globally. According to Doug McMillon, president and chief executive officer of Walmart Inc., Walmart hoped to provide expertise in sourcing and supply chain management, while learning how to build an e-commerce ecosystem from Flipkart (refer to Exhibit 3 for a snapshot of Walmart’s presence in Indian e-commerce market).11,12 Flipkart Flipkart, the market leader in the Indian e-retail market, offered over 80 million products across more than 80 categories, with 150,000 plus third-party sellers on its platform. In 2017, the company registered revenues of US$3 billion and employed 8000 permanent employees and about 25,000 contract workers. It reported a 29% y-o-y growth, and while its overall losses did increase by 68% over the previous year to US$1.3 billion, the effective increase was 2.4% as a large part of the loss was considered to be on account of a fall in the company’s valuation.13 Founded in 2007 as an online bookstore by Sachin Bansal and Binny Bansal, the company had grown rapidly. In 2008 it successfully delivered over 3,400 shipments across the country, and by 2009, managed to attract its first venture capital investment of US$1 million. It then expanded its presence by opening offices in Delhi and Mumbai (besides Bengaluru), and hiring more than 150 employees. To overcome the Indian consumers’ concerns regarding misuse of financial data shared online and an overall preference to deal in cash, the e-retailer introduced a ‘cash on delivery’ payment option in 2010, a first in the industry, that found an overwhelming acceptance in the domestic market. Over the next couple of years, Flipkart continued to introduce innovative services such as a 30-day return or replacement policy, and in terms of its network, expanded deliveries to 600 cities across India. It also launched its mobile shopping app, introduced the ‘saved cards’ feature that allowed the customers to securely save their credit card details on the platform, and started to accept even international cards in order to drive global reach. Adoption of the marketplace model allowed third-party sellers on its platform, and by 2014 the e-retailer’s product selection had expanded to include music, movies, games, electronics, large appliances, stationary, health, personal care, fashion accessories, apparel, toys and other lifestyle-related products. By the end of 2014, Flipkart raised US$1.9 billion in funding, was valued at US$11 billion, and registered GMV of US$1.9 billion.14 In line with its growth strategy, Flipkart acquired several companies over the years. These included the social book recommendation portal ‘WeRead’, the digital catalogue of Bollywood content portal ‘Chakpak’, music streaming and digital content platform ‘Mime360’, electronics e-retailer ‘Letsbuy’, fashion e-retailers ‘Myntra’ and ‘Jabong’, and eBay India. It also beefed up its after-sales services and payment platform by acquiring majority stakes in companies such as Jeeves and Ngpay. In 2017, it introduced new services such as ‘No Cost EMI’, a monthly instalment-based payment scheme with no processing fee, no hidden costs, no down payment and no interest pay-out; ‘Flipkart Assured’ – a guarantee that high quality products would be delivered to customers in the fastest time possible; and ‘PhonePe’ – a mobile payments app based on the Indian government-backed Unified Payment Interface (UPI). By 2017, Flipkart had more than 100 million registered shoppers and more than 50 million on its mobile app.15 However, despite growth in network and sales, Flipkart group continued to accrue losses primarily For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 4/9 on account of rising expenses, and a slowdown in the growth of revenue, especially as it battled with Amazon India (refer to Exhibit 4 for details on its financial performance over 2016 -2017). For the year ending March 2017, Flipkart Internet, the marketplace arm of Flipkart, reported revenue of US$340 million, a 15% y-o-y growth, and losses of US$254 million, a 29% y-o-y reduction. Amazon in India Amazon entered the Indian market in 2013, and under the country’s FDI policy was restricted from selling directly to consumers online. Hence the retailer set up operations as Amazon Seller Services – a marketplace for third-party sellers for Indian-made products, and adapted its product-to-delivery ecosystem considerably, to cater to the Indian business environment. In 2014, it launched an initiative called Amazon Chai Cart to educate small business owners in the country about the benefits of e-commerce, and its team travelled more than 9400 miles across 31 cities to on-board over ten thousand sellers.16 In 2015, to enable sellers getting online faster and easier, Amazon introduced Amazon Tatkal, which offered a number of launch services such as registration, imaging, cataloguing and sales training. In addition to setting up centralised fulfilment centres in the country, the retailer also introduced localised neighbourhood approaches such as Easy Ship – whereby Amazon picked up packaged goods from a seller and delivered it to consumers; and Seller Flex – in which sellers assigned a part of their own warehouse for products sold on Amazon while the e-retailer undertook the delivery process. For delivery, besides tying up with local courier services in the country, the company set up its own subsidiary Amazon Transportation Services in 2016. It also enlisted the numerous mom and pop stores that defined the retail sector in India as its delivery partners, especially in rural and remote areas of the country. Amazon committed to investing in a big way in India given the attractiveness of the Indian e-commerce market, and the aggressive competition it faced from the market leader Flipkart. In 2016, having exhausted the first tranche of US$2 billion, it pledged another US$3 billion in the market.17 By 2017 the retailer had grown its market share to 31%, and over the same period, Flipkart (standalone) had lost its market share from about 38% to 32%, although it continued to be the market leader.18 Amazon.in was found to be the fastest-growing marketplace and most visited site on both desktop and mobile platforms in India, with its mobile shopping app the most downloaded app.19 According to Brian Olsavsky, CFO, Amazon, India continues to be a good story for us…In fact, more Prime members joined India’s Prime programme in the first year than we’ve seen in any other country in the history of our world.20 By 2017 Amazon offered more than 40 million local products from third-party sellers under its Prime selection in India, had expanded to 67 fulfilment centres across 13 states to reduce delivery time on Prime, and was investing heavily in creating original content for its Prime video (refer to Exhibit 3 for a snapshot of Amazon’s presence in Indian e-commerce market) .21 For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 5/9 While the e-retailer’s revenues grew to US$491 million for fiscal year 2017, a 43% y-o-y growth, it accrued heavy losses to the tune of US$728 million, a 30% increase over the previous year.22 The increase in losses was considered to be primarily on account of expenses incurred for establishing infrastructure, opening new fulfilment centres and technology advancements. Call to War By the end of 2017, Walmart, on account of Flipkart’s acquisition, had the leading share in the Indian e-tail industry. However, Amazon led in product categories such as appliances, consumer electronics, and more importantly, groceries, and was fast closing the gap. With the Flipkart deal being hailed as round one to Walmart, Amazon soon responded in mid-2018 by acquiring the Aditya Birla Group-owned ‘More’ retail chain for US$580.35 million in a 49:51 partnership with Indian private equity firm Samara Capital.23 ‘More’ was the fourth- largest supermarket chain in India that competed against offline market leaders such as Big Bazar, and Reliance Retail. Walmart’s acquisition of Flipkart and Amazon’s acquisition of More signalled the aggressive pace of investments the two global giants were committed to for establishing a strong omni-channel network and capturing the dominant share of the Indian e-retail market. However, the accelerated expenses had led to Amazon International incurring a loss of US$3 billion in 2017, more than double the US$1.28 billion in 2016, despite a 23% jump in its net sales, and Walmart International reporting a decline in its gross profits to US$5.3 billion in 2017 from US$5.7 billion in 2016, with only a 1.7% increase in its net sales. Despite the underperformance, given their deep pockets, the question was not if the two retailers would stay committed for the long term, but rather in whose favour the competitive war would eventually end. For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 6/9 EXHIBIT 1: PERCENTAGE SHARE OF ONLINE RETAIL ACROSS PRODUCT CATEGORIES IN INDIA (2017) Source: Shelley Singh, “Amazon vs Walmart: Rumble in Indian retail”, The Economic Times, 3 July 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/amazon-vs-walmart-rumble-in-indian-retail/articleshow/64834246.cms, accessed September 2018. Electronics48%Apparel 29%Home & Furnishing 9%Baby, Beauty & Personal Care 8%Books4%Others2%For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 7/9 EXHIBIT 2: ESTIMATE OF E-RETAILERS MARKET SHARES IN INDIA (2017) E-Retailers Market share (GMV %) Flipkart Group (Inc Myntra, Jabong and others) 39.5 Flipkart (standalone) 31.9 Myntra 5 Jabong 2.2 Amazon 31.1 Paytm Mall 5.6 Snapdeal 2.5 ShopClues 2.1 Pepperfry 1.8 BigBasket 1.5 Others 15 Source: Mugdha Varrier, “Amazon India reportedly closing in on Flipkart”, The Economic Times, 22 March 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/amazon-india-reportedly-closing-in-on-flipkart/articleshow/63407725.cms, accessed September 2018. EXHIBIT 3: SNAPSHOP OF AMAZON AND WALMART E-COMMERCE OPERATIONS IN INDIA IN 2017 Amazon.In Walmart (Flipkart) Year of Entry June 2013 October 2007 (Walmart acquired in 2018) No. of Products (daily average) 170 million 80 million No. of Products added daily 200,000 150,000 + Third Party Sellers 340,000 100,000 Fulfilment Centres (dedicated to prime orders) 67 across 13 states (15) 21 Total Warehouse Capacity 20 million cubic feet 6.7 million square feet Product Categories Hundreds 80 + No. of Employees NA 26,000 For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 8/9 Pincodes Served 20,500 20,000 Top 5 Categories Mobiles, consumer electronics, fashion, large appliances and consumables Mobiles, footwear, apparel, TV, AC (in summer), laptops and other electronics Exclusive Partnerships Mobile brands: One Plus, Nokia Fashion brands: Under Armour, Steve Madden Jewellery Large Appliances brands: Samsung, BPL, variants of Bosch and LG Apparel & Footwear brands: Adidas, Reebok, Wildcraft, Peter England University, Allen Solly Jeans Electronics brand: Asus Mobile brands: Honor, AC brand: Midea, TV brand: Thomson Languages in which App/Site is available English English Source: Shelley Singh, “Amazon vs Walmart: Rumble in Indian retail”, The Economic Times, 3 July 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/amazon-vs-walmart-rumble-in-indian-retail/articleshow/64834246.cms, accessed September 2018. EXHIBIT 4: FLIPKART GROUP FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 2016-2017 USD billion (except for the percentage values) FY 2016 FY 2017 Y-o-Y Growth Revenue 2.3 3.0 29% Loss 0.8 1.3 68% Cash in Hand 0.63 0.55 (13%) Investments in Mutual Funds/Bonds 0.73 0.16 (78%) Advertisement & Promotion Expenses 0.16 0.18 9.4% Finance Cost 0.12 0.65 434% Employee Costs 0.28 0.31 9% Source: Varsha Bansal and Madhav Chanchani, “Flipkart losses swell 68% to Rs 8,771 crore in FY17”, The Economic Times, 3 February 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/flipkart-revenues-rise-29-losses-swell-68-in-fy17/articleshow/62761811.cms, accessed September 2018. For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.

SMU-18-0013 Amazon and Walmart on Collision Course in India (Case B) 9/9 Endnotes: 1 IBEF, “E-Commerce”, January 2018, https://www.ibef.org/download/Ecommerce-Report-Jan-2018.pdf, accessed September 2018. 2 The Economic Times, “Number of Online Shoppers to Surpass 120 Million in 2018”, 24 June 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/number-of-online-shoppers-to-surpass-120-million-in-2018/articleshow/64718407.cms, accessed September 2018. 3 Business Standard, “India’s Online Retail Space Grew by 23% in 2017, Pace to Accelerate in 2018”, 29 December 2017, https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/india-s-online-retail-space-grew-by-23-in-2017-pace-to-accelerate-in-2018-117122800511_1.html, accessed September 2018. 4 Soumya Gupta, “India’s E-commerce Market to Hit $200 Billion by 2026: Morgan Stanley Report”, 13 October 2017, https://www.livemint.com/Industry/9iUxlQZ4iHwPiXRKscx3LK/Indias-ecommerce-market-to-grow-30-to-200-billion-by-202.html, accessed September 2018. 5 Vivek Y. Kelkar, “Key Players Targeting India’s E-commerce Market”, Asia Times, 21 July 2018, |http://www.atimes.com/article/key-players-targeting-indias-e-commerce-market/, accessed September 2018. 6Telecom Lead, “Rural India has 500 Million Mobile Phone Subscriptions: TRAI”, 12 December 2017,https://www.telecomlead.com/telecom-statistics/rural-india-500-million-mobile-phone-subscriptions-trai-81161, accessed October 2018. 7 Ibid. 8 Asit Ranjan Mishra and Mihir Dalal, “Govt Defines E-commerce Marketplace Rules, Allows 100% FDI”, Live Mint, 30 March 2016, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/hglep85yZOQzChj6KRrrCK/Govt-allows-100-FDI-in-ecommerce-marketplace-model.html, accessed September 2018. 9 Nandita Bose, “Wal-Mart and Bharti Enterprises Call Off India JV”, Reuters, 9 October 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-bharti-india-idUSBRE99804E20131009, accessed September 2018. 10 Varsha Bansal, “Walmart India Cuts Losses by 27% in FY17”, The Economic Times, 7 May 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/walmart-india-cuts-losses-by-27-in-fy17/articleshow/64057675.cms, accessed September 2018. 11 ET Bureau, “Walmart Acquires Flipkart for $16 Billion in World’s Largest Ecommerce Deal”, The Economic Times, 10 May 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/walmart-acquires-flipkart-for-16-bn-worlds-largest-ecommerce-deal/articleshow/64095145.cms, accessed September 2018. 12 Bhumika Khatri, “Flipkart Losses Soar By 68% Despite 29% Growth In Revenue For FY17”, 3 February 2018, https://inc42.com/buzz/flipkart-revenue-loss-fy17/, accessed September 2018. 13 Varsha Bansal and Madhav chanchani, “Flipkart Losses Swell 68% to Rs 8,771 Crore in FY17”, The Economic Times, 3 February 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/flipkart-revenues-rise-29-losses-swell-68-in-fy17/articleshow/62761811.cms, accessed September 2018. 14 Spandan Sharma, “A Success Story 10 Years in the Making: Key Milestones from the Flipkart Journey”, Your Story, 9 May 2018, https://yourstory.com/2018/05/flipkart-through-the-years/, accessed September 2018. 15 Ibid. 16 Vijay Govindarajan and Anita Warren, “How Amazon Adapted Its Business Model to India”, Harvard Business Review, 20 July 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/07/how-amazon-adapted-its-business-model-to-india, accessed September 2018. 17 Anirban Sen, “Amazon Invests Another Rs 2,700 Crore in India Business”, Live Mint, 13 August 2018, https://www.livemint.com/Companies/8mRhajBBdUbcTJagSjKqFO/Amazon-invests-another-Rs-2700-crore-in-India-business.html, accessed September 2018. 18 Shelley Singh, “Amazon vs Walmart: Rumble in Indian Retail”, The Economic Times, 3 July 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/amazon-vs-walmart-rumble-in-indian-retail/articleshow/64834246.cms, accessed September 2018. 19 Amazon Inc, Annual Report 2018 20 Digbijay Mishra, “Amazon’s Global Loss at $3bn in 2017 on India Spend”, The Times of India, 3 February 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/amazons-global-loss-at-3bn-in-2017-on-india-spend/articleshow/62763336.cms, accessed September 2018. 21 Mugdha Varriyar, “Amazon’s Global Sales Grow Faster in Q1, Losses Remain High on India Investments”, The Economic Times, 28 April 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/amazons-global-sales-grow-faster-in-q1-losses-remain-high-on-india-investments/articleshow/63934531.cms, accessed September 2018. 22 Business Today, “Amazon India Sees Losses Widening to Rs 4,830 Crore in FY17”, 1 June 2018, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/corporate/amazon-india-losses-fy17-seller-services-discounts-flipkart/story/278224.html, accessed September 2018. 23 Writankar Mukherjee and Sagar Malviya, “Samara-Amazon Acquires Kumar Mangalam Birla’s More Retail Chain”, The Economic Times, 20 September 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/samara-amazon-acquires-kumar-mangalam-birlas-more-retail-chain/articleshow/65869738.cms, accessed September 2018. For the exclusive use of A. Aldawood, 2023.This document is authorized for use only by Ahmed Aldawood in TGM 515 Navigating Global and Regional Business Environments/Grosse (MGM FA23) taught by Robert Grosse, Thunderbird School of Global Management from Aug 2023 to Dec 2023.