Mission Command Principles, United States Army – Competence – Mutual Trust -Shared Understanding -Commander’s Intent – Mission Orders – Disciplined Initiativ

Changes in the 7th Edition Note: This page reflects the latest version of the APA Publication Manual (i.e., APA 7), which released in October 2019. The equivalent resource for the older APA 6 style can be found here.

The American Psychological Association (APA) updated its style manual in

the fall of 2019. This resource presents a list of important differences

between the sixth and seventh editions. It reflects the most recent printing

of the manual as of January 2020. If subsequent printings are released to

correct errors or misprints (as was the case for the sixth edition), this page

will be updated as needed.

The seventh edition of the APA Publication Manual contains a number of

updates and additions designed to make APA style more useful for

students, teachers, and other educational stakeholders. While there are too

many changes to list here, we’ve chosen to focus on the changes that are

most pertinent to students and teachers. These include changes to the

ways academic papers are formatted, changes to the ways sources are

cited, and more. For a much more detailed list of changes, consult the

Introduction chapter of the APA Publication Manual (7th ed.), which is

available from the APA in PDF form here.

For your convenience, locations in the print versions of the sixth and

seventh editions of the APA manual associated with each change are

provided below where possible.

Paper Formatting (Chapter 2)

THE TITLE PAGE (2.3)

The newest edition of the APA manual recommends different title pages for

students and professionals. Professional title pages include:

the title of the paper,

the name of each author of the paper,

the affiliation for each author,

an author note (if desired),

a running head (which also appears on the following pages,

a page number (which also appears on the following pages.

Students are directed to follow their instructors’ directions with regards to

title page formatting. If no directions are given, students may use the APA-

specified title page for students, which includes:

the title of the paper,

the name of each author of the paper,

the affiliation for each author (typically the school being attended),

the course number and name for which the paper is being written (use the

format used by the school or institution (e.g., ENGL 106),

the course instructor’s name and title (ask for the instructor’s preferred form

if possible, e.g., some instructors may prefer “Dr.,” “Ms.,” “Mrs.,” “Mr.,” or a

different title),

the assignment’s due date written in the format most common in your

country (e.g., either January 3, 2024, or 3 January 2024 may be

appropriate),

a page number (which also appears on the following pages.

*Note also that student papers now lack a running head.

HEADING LEVELS (2.27)

Headings are used to help guide the reader through a document. The

levels are organized by levels of subordination. In general, each distinct

section of an academic paper should start with a level one heading.

The seventh edition changes only level three, four, and five headings. All

headings are now written in title case (important words capitalized) and

boldface. Headings are distinguished only by the use of italics, indentation,

and periods.

Form 1009W, Assessing Writing

IAW TP 350-70-7 Appendix C Assessment Instruments NAME:

ASSIGNMENT TITLE: Analytical Essay DATE: FACILITATOR: RATING UNSATISFACTORY SATISFACTORY SUPERIOR RANGE 0 – 79.99 80 – 94.99 95 – 100 GRADE

COGNATIVE LEVEL ATTAINED: Higher levels include characteristics of lower levels. ANALYZING: Breaking material into constituent parts, determining how

the parts relate to each other and to an overall structure or purpose through differentiating, organizing, and attributing.

APPLYING: Carrying out or using a procedure through executing, or implementing.

UNDERSTANDING: Constructing meaning from oral, written, and graphic messages through interpreting, exemplifying, classifying, summarizing, inferring, comparing, and explaining.

REMEMBERING: Retrieving, recognizing, and recalling relevant knowledge from long-term memory.

Writing Assignment Analyze and evaluate the major points of your case study for research to write your analytical essay. Use your time to develop a deep understanding of your topic to fully explain your stance on the topic. You are required to give an in depth introduction of your topic. Provide transitional sentences from one topic to the next. Then develop the body of the paper fully using no less than 3 full pages and no more than 5 pages, this does not include the APA format title and references page. Finally, provide a summative conclusion. Provide a total of two references for your references page. Ensure you use Times New Roman 12 point font and the current APA Writing Style.

Facilitator’s Comments:

Facilitator’s Signature: Learner’s Comments:

Learner’s Signature:

INTRODUCTION 10% Unsatisfactory

0-6 pts. Satisfactory

7-8 pts. Superior 9-10 pts.

Does not adequately convey topic. Does not describe subtopics to be reviewed. Does not support thesis statement.

Conveys topic, describes subtopics to be reviewed. Generally supports Statement.

Strong introduction of topic clearly delineates subtopics to be reviewed. Fully supports thesis statement.

points for introduction TOPIC BODY 40%

Unsatisfactory 0-27 pts.

Satisfactory 28-34 pts.

Superior 35-40 pts.

Did not introduce any aspect of the topic or any instances were so vague as to imply there was much more information needed. Made little attempt to correlate the topic to the overarching theme. The body is less than three pages.

Partially introduced some of aspects of the topic. Developed and linked the topic to the overarching theme. The body meets 3-5 pages requirement.

Solidly introduced all aspects of the topic preparedness. Fully linked the topic to the overarching theme. The body meets 3-5 pages requirement.

points for body SEQUENCING AND TRANSITION 10%

Unsatisfactory 0-6 pts.

Satisfactory 7-8 pts.

Superior 9-10 pts.

Little evidence material is logically organized into topic, subtopics or related to topic. Many transitions are unclear or nonexistent.

Most material clearly related to main topic and subtopic. Material may not be organized within subtopics. Attempts to provide variety of transitions.

Strong organization and integration of material within subtopics. Strong transitions linking subtopics, and main topic.

points for sequencing and transition GRAMMAR AND CORRECTNESS 10%

Unsatisfactory 0-6 pts.

Satisfactory 7-8 pts.

Superior 9-10 pts.

Grammatical errors or spelling & punctuation substantially detract from the paper.

Very few grammatical, spelling or punctuation errors interfere with reading the paper.

The paper is free of grammatical errors and spelling & punctuation.

points for grammar and correctness READABILITY (sentence structure) 10%

Unsatisfactory 0-6 pts.

Satisfactory 7-8 pts.

Superior 9-10 pts.

Word choice is informal in tone. Writing is choppy, with many awkward or unclear passages.

Writing has minimal awkward or unclear passages.

Writing flows and is easy to follow.

points for readability APA FORMATTING 10%

Unsatisfactory 0-6 pts.

Satisfactory 7-8 pts.

Superior 9-10pts.

Errors in APA style detract substantially from the paper.

No more than 3 errors in APA style that do not detract from the paper.

No errors in APA style. Possesses a Scholarly style.

points for formatting REFERENCES 10%

Unsatisfactory 0-6 pts.

Satisfactory 7-8 pts.

Superior 9-10 pts.

No reference or one reference. 2 references (only). More than 2 references.

points for references

TOTAL POINTS

Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle

Case Studies in Defense Transformation Number 5 Richard Kugler

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Sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Forces Transformation and Resources

Prepared by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy

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3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University,Center for Technology and National Security Policy,Fort Lesley J. McNair BG 20,Washington,DC,20319

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12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.

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19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT unclassified

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. Dr. Richard L. Kugler is a consultant to the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. His specialty is U.S. defense strategy, global security affairs, and NATO. He advises senior echelons of the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the interagency community. An operations research analyst and political scientist, he holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Introduction In his memoirs, American Soldier, former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda, as an “absolute and unqualified success,” but one in which the original U.S. military battle plan “didn’t survive first contact with the enemy.”1 General Franks’ apt portrayal provides the framework for this case study of Operation Anaconda, which took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan during early March 2002. The goal of Operation Anaconda was to root out enemy Taliban and al Qaeda forces that had gathered in this valley following their earlier defeats in the initial three months of the war in Afghanistan. In order to achieve this goal, U.S. commanders crafted a complex and sophisticated battle plan involving a “hammer and anvil” attack by U.S. and friendly Afghan ground forces into the valley. This battle plan unraveled on the first day when enemy resistance proved fiercer than originally anticipated and friendly Afghan forces failed to carry out their march into the valley, thereby leaving deployed U.S. infantry forces to face the enemy alone. Success was achieved when U.S. forces switched tactical gears by calling on air strikes, in larger numbers than originally planned, to work with the ground forces to suppress and destroy the enemy. Originally planned as a three-day battle with light combat, Operation Anaconda turned out to be a seven-day battle with intense combat and was officially terminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 2–18, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed and the rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of U.S. and allied forces. U.S. casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Success was achieved because the U.S. military showed a capacity to adapt by employing joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and difficult challenge. As a result, this battle was the last time that year that enemy forces chose to engage U.S. forces in major combat in Afghanistan. In the aftermath, nonetheless, came controversies about several issues, including original intelligence estimates, the U.S. command structure, the initial reliance upon friendly Afghan forces, the armament of U.S. Army light infantry forces, and networked air-ground coordination of air strikes against enemy positions. In the months after Operation Anaconda, many of the problems encountered there were corrected by the U.S. military, and they did not reappear when Operation Iraqi Freedom, the invasion of Iraq, was launched in early 2003. Even so, the events of Operation Anaconda, the biggest pitched battle of the Afghanistan war, deserve to be remembered, as do its positive and negative lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation. The following pages endeavor to recount the battle’s key features, its initial frustrations, and its ultimate success.2 1 See General Tommy Franks (Ret. USA), American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 379. 2 This case study is based on research conducted by CTNSP/NDU, including interviews with senior U.S. military officers that participated in the battle. It also draws upon other published literature on Operation Anaconda.

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The Military Setting: How Earlier Battles Set the Stage for Anaconda Operation Anaconda was an outgrowth of earlier events during the war in Afghanistan. Major U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Freedom—began October 7, 2001, less than one month after the September 11 terrorist strikes against the United States. In endeavoring to topple the Taliban government and destroy al Qaeda, U.S. forces fought a new type of war in Afghanistan. The distant, landlocked country prohibited an immediate infusion of large ground forces. Instead, CENTCOM relied heavily upon special operation forces (SOF) teams that employed satellite radios, lasers, global positioning system (GPS) and Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to designate targets for air strikes, which were provided by cruise missiles and a combination of strike aircraft, including AC-130 gunships as well as strategic bombers and tactical fighters that delivered precision munitions, such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS). This new-era air operation of precision strikes and information networks was blended with ground operations by friendly Afghan forces from the Northern Alliance to form an effective campaign for the ambitious mission at hand.3 At first, U.S. combat operations commenced slowly because of the time needed to deploy forces to the region, establish suitable bases and logistic support, and secure support from friendly governments, including Uzbekistan and Pakistan. But by October 19, SOF teams and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives were in place with Northern Alliance forces, and CENTCOM was able to command a posture of nearly 400 aircraft and 32 ships, including two U.S. aircraft carriers. Over the next two months, major success was achieved. U.S. air strikes quickly destroyed Taliban bases, headquarters, air defenses, and logistic support. On the ground, Northern Alliance forces were lightly armed and outnumbered by the enemy by a margin of two-to-one. Supported by U.S. precision air strikes, nonetheless, Northern Alliance forces steadily overpowered Taliban and al Qaeda resistance. Key towns in northern Afghanistan—including Taloqan, Konduz, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif—fell over a three-week period. On November 9, Kandahar, the enemy’s last urban stronghold in southern Afghanistan, fell. On November 13, the enemy abandoned the capital city, Kabul, without a fight. By December 22, U.S. officials were attending a reception in Kabul celebrating the victory and installation of a new pro- American government under Hamid Karzai. Although enemy forces had been routed on the battlefield and the Taliban regime removed, the war was not yet over. Intelligence reports showed that remnants of Taliban and al Qaeda forces were gathering in Afghanistan’s eastern White Mountains, near the Pakistan border. In particular, large numbers of enemy appeared to be assembling in the Tora Bora region, to include Osama Bin Laden and other top al Qaeda figures. A major attack was launched on Tora Bora November 30. It included the now-familiar combination of U.S. SOF, strike aircraft, and friendly Afghan ground troops. This time, 3 For an analysis of the Afghanistan war, see Stephen D. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.)

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however, the Afghan troops were not from the battle-tested Northern Alliance, but instead from a local Pushtun militia under a warlord named Hazrat Ali. The U.S. bombing was intense, but the Pushtun militia failed to perform effectively. The result was that although several hundred enemy troops were killed or captured, a larger number escaped into Pakistan. Reports suggested that Osama bin Laden and his aides were among those who escaped. They were able to flee largely because insufficient allied ground troops were available to block likely escape routes. At the time, no sizable U.S. ground forces were deployed to Afghanistan. In many quarters of the U.S. military, Tora Bora was seen as a frustrating failure and a lost opportunity that drew attention to the need for more U.S. ground forces if similar operations were to be launched in the future. In important ways, the battlefield at Tora Bora set the stage for Operation Anaconda the following March. The Intelligence Picture: Enemy Forces in the Shahikot Valley In mid-January 2002, U.S. officials began receiving intelligence reports suggesting that enemy forces, including al Qaeda, were assembling in the Shahikot Valley. This valley was a natural place for the enemy to regroup its forces after its earlier defeats. Located in Paktia province, which borders Pakistan, the Shahikot Valley is about 80 miles southeast of Kabul, and 18 miles south of Gardez. At an altitude of 7,500 feet, it runs on a southwest-to-northeast axis. The valley is relatively small, about five miles long and two and a half miles wide. On the valley’s floor are four small towns: Marzak, Babulkhel, Serkhankhel, and Zerki Kale. Surrounding the valley are high mountainous ridges. On the western side is a humpback ridge called the “Whale,” which is four miles long, one mile wide, and almost 9,000 feet high. On the eastern side is a high ridgeline culminating in the south at a peak called Takur Ghar: at an elevation of 10,469 feet, it is the highest peak in the valley. Jutting into the valley’s southern end is an arrowhead-shaped ridgeline called the “Finger.” With its high ridgelines and limited access routes, the valley provided seclusion and natural protection to the gathering enemy fighters.4 The Shahikot Valley is relatively easy to defend. Its high ridges provide many natural caves, crevasses, and other protected locations for guerilla fighters to establish positions capable of raking the valley floor and access routes with gunfire. Twice during the 1980’s, the Soviets mounted assaults against the Shahikot Valley with attack helicopters, artillery, and infantry. On both occasions they withdrew in retreat, driven back by fierce resistance. In 2002, the U.S. military possessed capabilities, especially modern information networks and precision strike weapons, which surpassed the weaponry fielded by the Soviet Army. But the rugged terrain, high altitude, and cold foggy weather had not changed, thereby making it hard for an attacking force to operate. Events were to

4 For a journalistic analysis of Operation Anaconda, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: The Berkeley Publishing Group, 2005). See also: Mark G. Davis, Operation Anaconda: Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare, thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (Air University, 2004); Christopher F. Bentley, “Afghanistan: Joint and Coalition Fire Support in Operation Anaconda,” Field Artillery, September-October, 2002.

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show that the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters of 2002 intended to take full advantage of the valley in mounting an effort to repulse the latest attacker. As U.S. military officials began contemplating an assault on the Shahikot Valley in late January 2002, they faced a major drawback—lack of good intelligence on the number of enemy fighters and their weaponry. U.S. officials relied upon multiple sources of intelligence, including human intelligence, communications intercepts, and overhead reconnaissance. Even so, getting accurate and reliable intelligence was a serious problem. The difficulty owed partly to the rugged inaccessible terrain, and partly to the enemy’s skill at concealing and camouflaging itself. The lack of good intelligence was not due to any lack of effort. Indeed, during the two weeks before the battle, U.S. SOF sent several reconnaissance teams to get as close to the valley as possible without being detected, in the hope of getting a better picture of the enemy. Even this effort failed to produce an accurate, definitive picture. Judging from outward appearances, the valley seemed largely devoid of people: only small clusters were periodically detected. Confronted with this uncertainty, U.S. officials did their best to generate estimates of the enemy’s strength. Initially, intelligence estimates suggested that anywhere between 100– 1000 enemy fighters could be in the valley. But gradually, a consensus emerged that the number was likely 200–300 fighters with light weapons. In addition, the intelligence estimate suggested that 800–1000 Afghan civilians were living in the four villages on the valley floor, complicating any effort to bring U.S. firepower to bear without causing major civilian casualties. The picture created thus was not one of a formidable force, but instead a relatively weak and demoralized foe merged with a larger civilian population. U.S. officials contemplated how the enemy might react to an American assault composed of ground forces and precision air strikes. The consensus was that the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, readily defeated in the past and facing overwhelming firepower again, likely would not put up staunch resistance. A common belief was that they were mostly living in the valley’s villages, rather than deployed in the surrounding mountains and ridgelines. Another common belief was that they would try to flee the valley, and if that failed, try to negotiate a peaceful surrender. Thus, an invasion of the Shahikot Valley was deemed likely to take the form of some intense fighting at the start, followed quickly by police action aimed at arresting enemy fighters while ensuring innocent civilians were not harmed. For this reason, U.S. officials preferred to rely upon friendly Afghan soldiers to enter the valley floor and perform the arresting: they were judged better able than U.S. troops to separate al Qaeda fighters from innocent civilians. The role of U.S. ground troops was to block escape routes created by narrow passageways through the mountains on the valley’s eastern side. An extended, bitter battle for control of the valley was not on the minds of U.S. officials who designed the Operation Anaconda plan. Subsequent events showed that the U.S. attack on the Shahikot Valley was based on a faulty intelligence estimate. The actual number of fighters was considerably higher, perhaps 700–1000. They were more heavily armed than thought: they had heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mortars, and even a few artillery pieces. Most were not living in the villages, but instead were heavily deployed in the mountains and

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ridgelines. They occupied already prepared, concealed positions that gave them good fields of fire throughout the entire battle zone. Their machine guns and mortars were pre- sighted to provide accurate fires on critical points. The villages were almost deserted, with few fighters and even fewer civilians. Moreover, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters had no intention of ceding the valley without a fight or surrendering. Indeed, they intended to make a decisive stand in the hope of bloodying American and friendly Afghan troops. When the Anaconda battle began, they declared a ‘jihad.” Instead of enemy troops fleeing the valley, sizable numbers began entering the valley from outside, primed to fight the Americans. Inaccurate intelligence of enemy capabilities and intentions thus was the first thing that went wrong during Operation Anaconda. As U.S. and friendly Afghan troops approached the Shahikot Valley on March 2, they were expecting a battle involving light, brief combat followed by an easy, overwhelming victory. The entire operation was to be over in three days, and major fighting was to take place, if at all, only on the first day. What transpired was the opposite: a hard, pitched battle that dragged on for several days, during which the enemy put up fierce resistance and was dislodged only after intense U.S. bombing. This dramatic, unexpected change in enemy resistance was a main reason why, as General Franks said, the original battle plan did not survive initial contact with the enemy. The U.S. Military Command Structure for Anaconda: Multi- Headed A hallowed principle of war is unity of command that is military campaigns and battles should be commanded by a single senior officer with the authority and staff assets to blend the operations of all components into a single, cohesive plan. At the time Operation Anaconda began, unity of command had not been established because the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan was not yet fully mature. The earlier phases of the war had been conducted without a joint commander and command staff in Afghanistan. U.S. combat operations were directed by CENTCOM, led by General Franks, working through two main subordinate comman